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How Rome Fell By Adrian Goldsworthy

How Rome Fell

Death of a Superpower

by Adrian Goldsworthy

Mem. Ed. $22.49

Pub. Ed. $32.50

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How Rome Fell

Review by Thomas R. Martin

How to explain what happened to the ancient superpower that was the Roman Empire has long preoccupied historians. As Adrian Goldsworthy’s subtitle implies, interest in the subject has only increased in the light of the recent history of the United States and its (fading?) status as a superpower. Goldsworthy discusses the possible historical parallel in his introduction, adroitly debunking some mean-spirited criticism of the U.S. with his insightful remarks. His main purpose, of course, is to analyze the fate of the ancient Western world’s greatest power, imperial Rome. This clearly written and thoroughly researched book does that very well, and in a way that might provoke its readers to ask whether the present is repeating mistakes of the past.

Goldsworthy is critical of the recent scholarly tendency to interpret the gradual disappearance of Rome’s empire as a story of “transformation” rather than of “decline and fall.” His conclusion is that the latter description, which of course originated in the 18th-century history of Edward Gibbon, is preferable.

Proceeding chronologically, Goldsworthy reveals how the Roman Empire self-destructed in an orgy of frequent civil war and the abandonment of the governing principles of the aristocratic Republic, especially the primary role of the Roman Senate as a body of experienced citizens advising the state’s rulers. Relying on his expertise as a military historian, he argues that the Empire’s “fall” was not the result of the appearance of bigger and fiercer external enemies. Instead, he insists, the Roman Empire undermined itself through unending internal struggles over political power and self-aggrandizement by the elite. The creation of the Dominate as a new system of rule under Emperor Diocletian in the late third century only made the situation worse because it ended the political influence (though not the existence) of the Senate.

If I were to supplement Goldsworthy’s analysis, I would add a greater emphasis on economic factors in the Empire’s fall. Especially significant was the change in the financial effect of the army. In earlier periods, it had been a “profit center” because its conquests brought in capital and land through successful wars of expansion. Under the later Empire, by contrast, the military became an increasingly expensive source of a “negative cash flow,” as its costs had to be paid even when the legions were no longer generating new revenues for the central government. Let us hope that the financial failure of the Roman Empire is not another possible parallel to our contemporary situation.

Regardless of whether one wishes to accept the superpower parallel, the interesting detail and cogent analysis of Goldsworthy’s book provide a compelling story of why it makes sense to see the disappearance of the Roman Empire as a “fall” and not a “transformation.”

Hardcover: 544 pages

Publisher: Yale University Press ( May 01, 2009 )

Item #: 58-3426

ISBN: 9780300137194

Product Dimensions: 6.125 x 9.25 x 1.36 inches

Product Weight: 30.0 ounces

History How History Should Be Told
October 04, 2009

I would never go toe to toe with Goldsworthy on any detail as he would eviserate you. The book sometimes was so thick with detail it caused you to go back and read some twice. The first book I read by Goldsworthy on Ceasar hooked me and I started reading everything he wrote, He has to be the best new classicist alive. He destroyed many myths I carried from college. His research is beyond anything I have encountered from other historians. Using the same information available his conclusions usually brush aside some well entrenched thinking. This book is no light reading as he tempts you to check his notes. It was unfortunate for Rome for it may have lasted anoother 1000 years. After Marcus Aurelius the Empire spent all it's resources to maintain the personal safety and power of the Emperor. It is easy to compare it to the US's Senate and Congress who will do anything to ensure their survial. There has to be lesson there. Outstanding book

Reviewer: Tom

Highly Informative
September 01, 2009

Goldsworthy's motivation for writing this book appealed to me. He describes his prior "dissatisfaction with quite a few of the the conclusions and assumptions" in other works on the topic. I hoped he could satisfy my curiosity and he did. I am glad that I read this book. Goldsworthy finds himself in significant agreement with Edward Gibbon's two hundred year-old conclusion. Given the known extent of internal strife, it is a wonder that Rome lasted as long as it did. This author steps methodically through every successor to every emporor and all the wild branches of succession that sprouted up in the form of the many usurpers. This thoroughness demonstrates undeniably that succession and related violence rendered Rome fundamentally unstable. Goldsworthy mostly rejects the moral decay portion of Gibbon's theory. that the internal dysfunction in Imperial priorities resulted from the very basic human instinct amomg the emperors to attain physical security. To my surprise and appreciation, Goldsworthy frames the fall of Rome in terms of Organizational Dynamics. He cites organizational changes that the emperors made to improve their security actually backfired. His intriguing thesis delves into the pitfalls of segregating functional responsibilities, decentralization, and burgeoning bureaucracy. Warning: The author's thoroughness in demonstrating the persistence of succession problems and civil war means that no succession or ursurpation goes unnoticed. Although this strengthens the book's conclusion, it occasionally makes the reading tediousness. It doesn't help that many of the names of the cameo appearances are very similar. Goldsworthy makes up for this with a chronology, glossary, and excellent bibliography at the end.

Reviewer: Mike M

Great Read
July 17, 2009

Great Read for any history book lover

Reviewer: Shyam

Final thoughts
June 11, 2009

I agree with the author's explanation for the longer survival of the eastern Empire. Although I doubt that the barbarians COULD NOT cross into Asia, since the Saxons and Vandals succeeded in traversing more daunting water barriers--and the Goths had successfully employed ships to raid far into Asia Minor--the fact is that they just DID NOT do so, so most of the eastern Empire's territory was preserved. After pludering the East's balkan regions, the barbarians moved west, which became their final destination, not the Asian provinces. Ergo, the eastern Empire survived in the fifth century basically because of good luck. But there was more. Anastasius finally addressed the fundamental problem of the age--the unwillingness of citizen--as opposed to barbarians--to serve in the empire's armies.

Reviewer: Tim D

Concerning the basic thesis
June 11, 2009

The book contains some material that was new to me, and so was worthwhile, even if I don't buy its basic thesis. Mr. Goldsworthy wrote that excluding senators from military commands was intended to prevent usurpers, since only senators were deemed worthy of the purple. But excluding senators made the emperor less, not more secure, inasmuch as those of equestrian rank were now eligible--and far more numerous. That is an interesting observation, but I wouldn't go so far as to say that civil wars and an obsession with personal power and security ruined the Empire. Trying to prevent usurpation was generally in the best interest of the Empire as well as the emperor, and the later rulers usually did the best they could against foreign enemies. The problem was that by the late fourth and fifth centuries they just NO LONGER HAD ADEQUATE MILITARY MEANS. I don't think the "rot started at the top." While the failure to ensure an orderly succession was a serious problem, IMO it was not the fundamental issue. The real problem, as I see it, was that by c 400 at the latest, the Roman masses basically just didn't care about the Empire anymore. The army had to recruit barbarians because few citizens wanted to serve. It surely says much about the loss of dedication to Rome that its late army was mainly composed of barbarians--and that despite the fact that the Empire's population was far greater than that of the invaders. What is most telling is the passivity with which the late Roman population accepted defeats. The sack of Rome in 410, and again in 455, were virtualy unopposed by the people of the city itself; nor did the North African populace seem to resist the Vandal encroachments of the 430s. The people just became indifferent to the fate of the Empire. Even had the succession been perfectly orderly, how could the empire survive with so little from its own citizens?

Reviewer: Tim D

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