The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World
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Chapter One
War: "Now or Never"
War is . . . an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.-Carl von Clausewitz
Since I have been at the foreign office," Arthur Nicolson noted at Whitehall in May 1914, "I have not seen such calm waters." Europe had, in fact, refused to tear itself to pieces over troubles in faraway lands: Morocco in 1905-06 and in 1911; Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908-09; Libya in 1911-12; and the Balkans in 1912-13. The Anglo- German naval arms race had subsided, as had the fears about the Berlin- to-Baghdad Railway, since Berlin had run out of money for such gargantuan enterprises. Russia had overcome its war with Japan (1904-05), albeit at a heavy price in terms of men and ships lost and domestic discontent. Few desolate strips of African or Asian lands remained to be contested, and Berlin and London were preparing to negotiate a "settlement" of the Portuguese colonies. France and Germany had not been at war for forty-three years and Britain and Russia for fifty-eight.
Partition of the Continent by 1907 into two nearly equal camps-the Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy, and the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia-seemed to militate against metropolitan Europe being dragged into petty wars on its periphery. Kurt Riezler, foreign-policy adviser to German chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, cagily argued that given this model of great-power balance, future wars "would no longer be fought but calculated." Guns would no longer fire, "but have a voice in the negotiations." In other words, no power would risk escalating minor conflicts into a continental war; instead, each would "bluff" the adversary up the escalatory ladder, stopping just short of war in favor of diplomatic settlement. Peace seemed assured.
Domestically, for most well-off and law-abiding Europeans, the period prior to 1914 was a golden age of prosperity and decency. The "red specter" of Socialism had lost much of its threat. Real wages had shot up almost 50 percent between 1890 and 1913. Trade unions had largely won the right to collective bargaining, if not to striking, and their leaders sat in parliaments. Many workers had embraced social imperialism, believing that overseas trade and naval building translated into high-paying jobs at home. Germany had paved the path toward social welfare with state-sponsored health insurance, accident insurance, and old-age pensions. Others followed. Women were on the march for the vote. To be sure, there was trouble over Ireland, but then official London hardly viewed Ireland as a European matter.
Excerpted from The Marne, 1914 by Holger H. Herwig Copyright (c) 2009 by Holger H. Herwig. Excerpted by permission of Random House, a division of Random House, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Review by Brigadier General (Ret.) Robert A. Doughty
The battle of the Marne in the opening days of the Great War shaped not only the subsequent years of the war but also the entire 20th century. Had the Germans won the battle, the course of history could have been very, very different. Germany may have dominated the European continent and the world may have been spared the horrible bloodletting of 1915-1918 and the great catastrophe of 1939-1945. Yet, as Holger Herwig ably argues, the margin of the French and British victory on the Marne was narrow, very narrow. The outcome of the battle, as well as the shape of subsequent events, turned on seemingly small things, such as the contrasting command styles of Joseph Joffre and Helmuth von Moltke, the remarkable refusal of the French poilu to quit fighting, and the incredible acceptance by the German First and Second Army commanders of Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch’s “recommendation” to retreat from the Marne. Herwig wisely observes, “Nothing about the Marne was preordained. Choice, chance and contingency lurked at every corner.”
During the battle soldiers on both sides endured endless marching, constant thirst, searing heat and incredible challenges. After the French offensives in Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes failed miserably, Joffre reorganized his badly mauled forces and shifted them to the west to meet the German main thrust. Meanwhile, Moltke continued single-mindedly to press his forces toward Paris even though his communications were limited severely by his having only a single radio transmitter and a cumbersome cipher system. At the crucial moment in the fighting, as Herwig notes, communications proved to be the Germans’ “Achilles' heel.” The result was a miraculous victory for the French and the beginning of a two-front war for the Germans of unknown cost and duration.
To tell this story Herwig has done extensive research, especially in the German and Austro-Hungarian archives, and he pointedly disagrees with some noted historians on important issues associated with the “miracle” of the Marne. He rejects Fritz Fischer’s thesis that Germany went to war in 1914 as part of a “grab for power,” and he dismisses Terrence Zuber’s argument that “There never was a ‘Schlieffen Plan.’” He also criticizes the Germans for the “looting and shooting” that accompanied their march through France and Belgium. His book, however, is not an anti-German treatise, for he dishes out criticism whenever it is deserved. He notes, for example, that the British moved north at a “snail’s pace” when the opening appeared between the German First and Second Armies at a decisive moment in the battle and the local French commander, Louis Franchet d’Espèrey, seemed “bedeviled” when he faced the “fog of uncertainty” at precisely the same moment.
Herwig’s nicely balanced book goes far beyond previous partisan accounts and is much more than a simple narrative of actions and decisions in August-September 1914. Eminently readable and persuasively argued, his book is military history at its best.
Hardcover: 416 pages
Publisher: Random House Inc. ( December 01, 2009 )
Item #: 77-9444
ISBN: 9781400066711
Product Dimensions: 6.125 x 9.25 x 0.99 inches
Product Weight: 21.0 ounces

I have read a few books on WW 1 and this book is by far one of if not the best for anyone intrested in the Great War. The books truely gives you all the indepth details that bring to light a part of the Great War that was hidden from view. FANTASTIC BOOK and easy read. If anyone from beginner to advance intrest in the Great War should read this book you won't be able to put the book down, I couldn't and was finished before I knew it.
Reviewer: Carl
I can't do better than the general regarding a review. Exhaustively researched; gives someone like me who knew very little about the Marne a detailed description. I do have one criticism: for those of us who are unfamiliar with this battle, more detailed maps would help. There weren't enough of them and those that were used were too general.
This isn't for posting. Just wanted the editors, or whoever reads these, to know the slight shortcoming of this book.
Reviewer: Thomas P
Great book to read about WWI western front begining. Gave me a whole look at the improtance of the battle for the Marne. Lots of great battle maps that help to following the text.
Reviewer: Gavin S
I have read many books on World War I but none has gone into such readable detail as this book. The author is is obvious command of his facts and provides a wealth of facts from the German point of view that is often lacking in other accounts of the opening campaign on the Western Front. He also provides a great amount of detailed information about the human interactions between the commanders and political leaders on both sides which is also lacking in most accounts. What drove me almost to distraction about this book, however, was the faded out poorly labeled maps. Why, after putting in such a tremendous amount of time writing this excellent text did the author do such a poor job in providing maps? I would recommend this book for it's insights and store of information but warn the reader that the maps are very poor.
Reviewer: John A
One of the questions I look to have answered when I read histories of the 20th Century is, "What happened to the Germans that they would follow Hitler's lead." Going backwards, I have read histories of the 3rd Reich (Shirer, Evans, Burleigh), Hitler bios (Kershaw), sociologies (Hunt, Gellately, Kater), Weimar (Weitz); these led to Versailles Treaty histories (1919), and then to WWI histories (Tuchman, Keegan, Strachan, Stone). While not much of a reader of military histories I picked up Holger Herwig's Marne, 1914. While a fairly detailed military history (to my tastes) I found it gave an excellent account of the leaders and strategies -- mostly failed -- that led to the the great stalemate that characterized WWI and linked that War to the rise of the Nazi's. My one criticism, as a less than amateur reader of military history, is that the story was hard to follow without good maps. When I finally purchased the West Point Atlas of the Great War, the story was easier to follow.
Reviewer: John